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Improving the international trading sys-
tem does not require new, comprehensive
multilateral agreement. Countries can derive
large gains from the trading system by en-
gaging in reforms often referred to as trade
facilitation.
In broad terms, trade facilitation includes
reforms aimed at improving the chain of ad-
ministrative and physical procedures involved
in the transport of goods and services across
international borders. Countries with inade-
quate trade infrastructure, burdensome ad-
ministrative processes, or limited competition
in trade logistics services are less capable of
benefiting from the opportunities of expand-
ing global trade. Companies interested in
investing, buying, or selling in local markets
are less likely to bother if there are too many
frictions related to document processing or
cargo inspection at customs, antiquated port
facilities, logistics bottlenecks, or limited reli-
ability of freight or trade-financing services.
According to recent studies from the
World Bank and other international eco-
nomic institutions, trade facilitation reforms
could do more to increase global trade flows
than further reductions in tariff rates. For
many developing countries—particularly
those that receive preferential tariff treat-
ment from rich countries—reducing trans-
portation and logistics-related costs through
trade facilitation reforms would be much
more beneficial than further tariff cuts.
But trade facilitation does not only offer
promise to developing countries. All coun-
tries can benefit by removing sources of fric-
tion in their supply chains. The post-9/11
focus on minimizing the risk of terrorists
exploiting porous international supply
chains to sneak weapons of mass destruction
into U.S. cities—obviously a vital objective
—could hamper the capacity of American-
based companies to attract investment and
compete for markets. Likewise, U.S. prohi-
bitions against foreign competition in trans-
portation services and the political antipathy
toward foreign investment in U.S.port oper-
ations raise the costs of doing business and
increase the scope for trade facilitation in the
United States.
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Introduction
Reductions in formal trade barriers have
spurred dramatic increases in trade and invest-
ment during the past six decades. Most econo-
mists agree that a Doha Round accord that
achieves further cuts in agricultural and indus-
trial barriers would inspire even greater trade
and growth, particularly among developing
countries. But for a variety of reasons beyond
the scope of this paper, Doha lies in a cryogenic
state. And it could be a while before the nego-
tiations thaw.
Fortunately, comprehensive multilateral
agreement is not the only way to improve the
trading system. There are plenty of measures
countries can undertake on their own accord
and in pursuit of their own interests to promote
further trade, investment, and growth. We can
endure the effects of a “trade timeout” and still
derive more value from the trading system by
implementing measures broadly referred to as
“trade facilitation.”
Though definitions vary, trade facilitation
generally refers to reforms aimed at improving
the chain of administrative and physical proce-
dures involved in the transport of goods and
services across international borders. Some
definitions of trade facilitation go further into
the domestic economy to touch institutions,
industries, and regulations that affect the trade
supply chain, but are not necessarily involved
directly or exclusively in the trade process.
Countries with inadequate trade infrastruc-
ture are less capable of benefiting from the
opportunities of expanding global trade. Many
forego chances to participate meaningfully in
the evolving, intricate web of transnational
supply chains, depriving their economies of
foreign investment, their producers of larger
markets, and their consumers of greater variety
and affordability. The weakness in the system
for these countries is not that foreign tariffs are
necessarily too restrictive—many have duty-
free access to rich country markets through a
variety of preference programs, and general tar-
iffs are relatively low and declining. Instead, the
real difficulty is that the persistence of admin-
istrative, bureaucratic, and physical bottlenecks
along their export and import supply chains
makes it difficult for such countries to capital-
ize on those favorable conditions.
Like tariff cuts, improvements in trade facil-
itation procedures can help reduce the cost of
trade and increase its flow. A 2004 United
Nations study revealed burdensome processes in
developing countries, where the average cus-
toms transaction involves 20 to 30 parties and
requires 40 separate documents to complete.1 A
2004 World Bank study of 75 countries found
that if “below average” performers on a compila-
tion of four broad trade facilitation indices were
able to raise their scores “halfway to the average”
score for all 75 countries, world trade would
increase by $377 billion, or about 9 percent per
year.2
But trade facilitation reforms are not only for
developing countries; they are also crucial to the
United States and other rich countries, where
there is ample scope to improve performance in
many different facets of logistics, the provision
of trade-related services, and administrative pro-
cedures. At present, on a variety of trade facilita-
tion indices, U.S. performance lags behind the
performance of other countries with which the
United States competes for markets and invest-
ment. One recent study suggests that a one-day
improvement in the average time it takes to
move U.S. cargo from a warehouse to the port of
export and inbound cargo from the port to a
domestic warehouse could increase U.S. trade by
almost $29 billion per year.3
Getting final and intermediate goods in,
across, around, and out of the United States
with minimal friction is vital to maintaining
and increasing direct investment, restraining
producers’ costs, and passing on benefits to
consumers, particularly given the accelerating
trend toward decentralized, transnational man-
ufacturing processes. Closing the trade facilita-
tion performance gap will be crucial to U.S.
competitiveness going forward.
Economic research supports the intuitive
conclusion that lower costs, faster movement
through logistical processes, and better reliabil-
ity of supply chains are associated with greater
trade flows. Some studies suggest that key
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determinants of lower costs, faster movement,
and better reliability are, among other things,
greater procedural transparency, less bureaucra-
cy, more competition in trade-related services,
and greater intensity in the use of technology
in customs processes.
Negotiations on trade facilitation are part of
the Doha agenda, where the mandate is to “clar-
ify and improve relevant aspects of [the germane
GATT articles] with a view to further expediting
the movement, release and clearance of goods,
including goods in transit.”4 The mandate also
states that because some of the reforms envisaged
in the trade facilitation negotiations might require
large expenditures on the parts of resource-chal-
lenged countries, “negotiations shall also aim at
enhancing technical assistance and support for
capacity-building in this area.”5 Thus, for the first
time ever in a GATT negotiating round, com-
mitments to undertake reforms by some coun-
tries are to be conditioned upon other countries
providing the resources presumed to be necessary
to fulfill those commitments.
The inclusion of “negotiations” on trade
facilitation and capacity-building in the Doha
Round, while positive in the sense that it draws
attention to these important issues, simultane-
ously introduces complications that could retard
or halt a reform process that is already underway
voluntarily.Trade facilitation—like tariff liberal-
ization—is primarily and substantially in the
interest of the country implementing the re-
form. By treating reforms as reciprocal and
binding, countries may become skeptical of the
benefits of reforms and reluctant to implement
them. And the “aid-for-trade” component that
the negotiating language stipulates may give
developing countries incentive to inflate their
needs assessments and to withhold reform com-
mitments for the purpose of bidding up finan-
cial commitments.
Trade facilitation measures are particularly
relevant today, as economists routinely identify
logistics-oriented costs as greater deterrents to
trade than tariffs and other formal barriers.
Though the scope for reform differs between
rich and poor countries, every country can ben-
efit from trade facilitation without the need for
new trade agreements.
Trade Facilitation Is for Poor
and Rich Countries Alike
More than a century and a half ago, the
French classical liberal economist Frederic
Bastiat observed the following:
Between Paris and Brussels obstacles of
many kinds exist. First of all, there is
distance, which entails loss of time, and
we must either submit to this ourselves,
or pay another to submit to it. Then
come rivers, marshes, accidents, bad
roads, which are so many difficulties to
be surmounted. We succeed in building
bridges, in forming roads, and making
them smoother by pavements, iron
rails, etc. But all this is costly, and the
commodity must be made to bear the
cost. Then there are robbers who infest
the roads, and a body of police must be
kept up, etc.
Now, among these obstacles there is
one which we have ourselves set up, and
at no little cost, too, between Brussels
and Paris. There are men who lie in
ambuscade along the frontier, armed to
the teeth, and whose business it is to
throw difficulties in the way of trans-
porting merchandise from the one
country to the other. They are called
Customhouse officers, and they act in
precisely the same way as ruts and bad
roads.6
In Bastiat’s time, rapid technological progress
in transportation led to a dramatic decline in
freight costs, sparking the first great wave of
globalization. Although tariffs were liberalized
somewhat in Britain and Europe by the middle
of the 19th century, they still were considerable
for many products. Bastiat’s equating of the con-
sequences of natural barriers (distance, marshes,
rivers, ruts and bad roads) to the consequences of
man-made barriers (customhouse officers) is just
as apt today.
As formal tariffs have fallen considerably in
recent decades because of international agree-
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ments and unilateral reforms, the ill effects of
inefficient customs procedures and other man-
made, transport-related barriers have become
more apparent. To reap greater economic ben-
efits from stroke-of-the-pen tariff liberaliza-
tion, countries should focus on improving their
competitiveness by linking into what The
Economist has dubbed the “physical internet.”7
At a general level, trade facilitation concerns
the chain of administrative and physical proce-
dures involved in the transport of goods and ser-
vices across borders. Some definitions go further
into the domestic economy to include institu-
tions, industries, and regulations that affect the
trade supply chain, but are not involved directly
or exclusively in the trade process. Numerous
activities relate to or affect in some way the flow
of goods and services, including document pro-
cessing, cargo inspection, port logistics, freight
services, financing, and much more. Trade facil-
itation measures aim to improve performance
throughout this logistical process.
A few anecdotes help convey the wide scope
for reform around the world. Robert Guest, who
formerly covered Africa for The Economist, has
described his firsthand experience with the sup-
ply chain for beer in Cameroon:
I once hitched a ride on a beer truck in
Cameroon to investigate what it was
like delivering beer to people in the
hot Cameroonian rainforest. It was
not a very long journey. . . [and] was
supposed to have taken us three-quar-
ters of a day. In the event, it took us
four days. Part of the reason was that
the roads were so appalling. . . . But the
main problem was that we were
stopped 47 times at police roadblocks.
West African roadblocks typically
consist of a pile of oil drums in the mid-
dle of the road and maybe a piece of
wood with nails sticking upwards,
which a 10-year-old boy pulls aside
once travelers are allowed to proceed.
There is also typically a crowd of
policemen relaxing under the shade of a
tree. The policemen get up and very
leisurely inspect the axles and taillights.
They also go through the driver’s
papers looking for every little problem.
They then start the delicate process of
negotiation about what you are going
to do to make it up to them that you are
breaking the law. We were delayed for
between five minutes and four hours by
each of those 47 roadblocks.
While on the road, I was trying to
understand what was going on. The
policeman at roadblock number 31
gave me what I thought was the most
pithy explanation. He had not been
able to find anything wrong and so he
made up a rule about carrying passen-
gers in beer trucks that, he insisted, we
had broken. I said to him, “Look, this
rule you are citing does not exist, does
it?” He patted his holster and said,
“Do you have a gun?” I said that I did
not, to which he responded, “Well, I
have a gun so I know the rules.”8
Guest’s experience is not necessarily repre-
sentative of the situations in all poor African
countries. Some developing countries—includ-
ing in Africa—perform reasonably well on trade
facilitation metrics designed by World Bank
researchers. But more often than not, the worst
performers tend to be developing countries.
A story in the World Bank’s annual Doing
Business survey provides a perfect illustration of
the prospective benefits of trade facilitation in
another developing country:
Tarik, a fish exporter from Yemen,
knows the benefits of reform: “If I
export fresh tuna to Germany, I get
$5.20 a kilo. If I export frozen tuna to
Pakistan, I get $1.10 a kilo. I would
like everything to go to Germany. But
it takes so long to comply with all the
exporting procedures that the fresh
tuna frequently goes bad. So only 15%
of the fish is sent to Germany. My fac-
tory exports 2,000 tons of tuna a year.
You make the calculation.”9
If Tarik sold all of his 2,000 tons of fresh tuna to
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Germany, his revenues would be about $10.4
million. Instead, because it takes on average 33
days to export from Yemen, he sells only 300
fresh tons to Germany for about $1.6 million
and 1,700 frozen tons to Pakistan for $1.8 mil-
lion—an opportunity cost of $7 million per year.
Delays in processing and moving cargo not
only raise the costs of trade and destroy business
opportunities, they are sometimes a matter of
life and death. A March 2008 story in the
Washington Post reported that containers full of
imported food were rotting in Haitian ports on
account of bureaucratic incompetence. “While
millions of Haitians go hungry, containers full of
food are stacking up in the nation’s ports because
of government red tape—leaving tons of beans,
rice and other staples to rot under a sweltering
sun or be devoured by vermin.”10 Haitian
authorities attributed the delays to stepped-up
efforts to stop drug smuggling, which accentu-
ates the point that trade facilitation reforms
must strike the proper balance between com-
merce and enforcement.
Trade facilitation reforms are not only nec-
essary in developing countries. There is plenty
of scope for reform in rich countries, as well.
More typically, though, trade facilitation prob-
lems in rich countries are less severe by orders
of magnitude. Consider the following example
from France.
Relatively low productivity at publically
owned cargo-handling terminals in France led
to a recent decision by the French government
to privatize stevedoring at seven of its nine
public ports.11 That decision was based on an
analysis that found low productivity had caused
a 50 percent decline in French container traffic,
which was lost to European rivals.
Certainly, that decision constitutes trade
facilitation—a reform that will likely lead to
increased business and revenues at French ports
with positive spillover effects for the regions
served by those ports. But the French reform is
probably much less daunting than the kinds of
measures that would be required in Cameroon
or Yemen. Given the beer truck travails in the
country’s interior, privatizing the ports in
Cameroon would be a bit like rearranging the
Titanic’s deck furniture. Under better circum-
stances, it would certainly matter. But given the
logistics troubles throughout the supply chain in
Cameroon, privatizing the ports would not nec-
essarily be a priority.
Yet, just as the proper improvements in
Cameroon’s and Yemen’s supply chains likely
would lead to more commerce, more invest-
ment, and economic growth, France’s relatively
straightforward process of privatizing its ports is
being undertaken with the objective of boosting
annual container traffic from 3.6 million TEUs
(20-foot equivalent units) to 10 million TEUs
by 2015 and creating 30,000 jobs on the water-
front.12
Another example of the costs of logistics
shortcomings can be found in the lack of com-
petition in freight rail service in many parts of
the United States. In 1980 Congress deregulat-
ed most railroad activities but did not remove
the various antitrust exemptions that had been
granted to the railroad industry during the last
century, when it was more highly regulated.
Since 1980 the number of “Class I”13 freight
providers has decreased from 40 to 7 through
consolidation, and four control 90 percent of
the nation’s rail traffic.14
Not only does the limited competition result
in higher costs and competitive disadvantages
for U.S. manufacturers and farmers who need to
get their product to both domestic and export
markets, it also discourages foreign investment.
According to a recent communication from sev-
eral state attorneys general to the U.S. Congress:
Multi-national companies that can site
their plants in any number of countries
are extremely reluctant to invest in a
U.S. site that is served by a single rail-
road. One global forest products com-
pany is currently considering a major
investment at the site of its current
paper manufacturing facility in a
Midwestern state. The site is served by
a single railroad. The transportation
cost of moving finished product from
this Midwestern state to its market in
the southeastern U.S., a distance of
about 1,400 miles, is the same as the
transportation cost of moving the fin-
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ished product from Europe to the same
southeastern U.S. market, a distance of
almost 5,000 miles. This domestic
transportation cost disadvantage pre-
sents a significant obstacle to increased
foreign investment in our nation.15
In some countries trade facilitation shortcom-
ings are monumental, endemic, and require huge
commitments of resources to overcome. In other
countries there are smaller inefficiencies that need
to be optimized. But countries can benefit from
some degree of trade facilitation—without need
of international trade agreements. As global trade
continues to expand, countries will be compelled
to engage in autonomous logistics reforms as
domestic inefficiencies and the costs of foregone
opportunities are magnified.
Greater Benefits than
Further Tariff Cuts
With tariffs and other formal trade barriers
having been lowered considerably over the
course of the past 60 years, international trade
now constitutes a significant portion of global
economic activity. To benefit from the global
division of labor, supply chains often traverse
multiple countries, so the capacity to move goods
quickly, reliably, and inexpensively through the
chain is a crucial determinant of business success.
Accordingly, importers and exporters are con-
cerned about reducing the costs associated with
Customs and other border agency procedures,
excessive paperwork, bureaucratic ineptitude,
and poor physical infrastructure. Countries that
can create and maintain relatively frictionless
logistics environments are more likely to partici-
pate meaningfully and prosperously in the glob-
al economy.
Much research has been devoted to study-
ing the impact of transportation costs as well as
indirect transport-related costs, like time and
distance, on trade flows. In a trailblazing 2001
paper, Purdue University economist David
Hummels estimated that each additional day
spent in transport reduces the probability that
the United States will source from that locality
by 1 to 1.5 percent.16 He also estimated that
each day saved in shipping time equates to a
0.8 percent reduction in the cost of manufac-
tured goods.17
A 2001 paper published by the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation found that a 3 percent
reduction in the “landed cost” of merchandise
trade between APEC countries, which could be
accomplished by implementing electronic docu-
mentation for cargo entries, could reduce overall
trade costs within the region by $60 billion.18 A
more recent paper from the United Nations
Committee on Trade and Development found
that a 1 percent reduction in the cost of mar-
itime and air transport services in developing
countries could increase global GDP by $7 bil-
lion (in 1997 dollars). Another $7 billion could
be gained from a 1 percent improvement in the
productivity of the wholesale and retail trade
services sector.19
A 2006 World Bank paper based on data col-
lected for the “Trading Across Borders” section
of the World Bank’s annual Doing Business report
offered some profound and far-reaching insights
into the relationship between time delays and
trade flows. The “Trading Across Borders” data
were gathered from a survey of freight for-
warders, port operators, and customs officials
located in more than 150 countries. Data collect-
ed included the number of days outbound cargo
waits at the exporter’s border, the number of days
inbound cargo waits at the importer’s border, the
number of documents needed to export, the
number of documents needed to import, the
number of signatures necessary for export docu-
mentation, and the number of signatures neces-
sary for import documentation.20
Analyzing data from Doing Business (2005),
World Bank researchers estimated that for each
day a product is delayed prior to shipment
(exports or imports), trade is reduced by 1 per-
cent. For perishable products and other time-
sensitive goods (remember Tarik, the Yemeni
fish exporter), the reduction in trade is much
greater.21 Those results suggest that improve-
ments in trade facilitation would do more to
stimulate trade than would further tariff liberal-
ization. As noted by trade and customs lawyer
Steven Creskoff, the pending U.S.-South Korea
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Free Trade Agreement is projected to add $20
billion in bilateral annual trade, but a one-day
reduction in U.S. transit time for both imports
and exports—based on the World Bank study
results—would increase total trade by $28.9 bil-
lion annually.22
Tariff elimination in rich countries—where
tariffs are already low or nonexistent through
preference programs—could increase develop-
ing country exports by 2 to 10 percent23
(although for some countries, the impact of tar-
iff elimination could be adverse, as the preferen-
tial tariff treatment they had been receiving is
negated by a reduction in the general, most-
favored-nation rate—a process referred to as
“preference erosion”). Alternatively, according to
the findings of a 2007 paper from the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development based on the same Doing Business
data, a 10 percent increase in exports from non-
OECD countries to OECD countries can be
achieved by reducing export time by a range of
2.32 days (for East Asia and Pacific countries,
where the average in 2006 was 25.8 days) to 4.5
days (for Sub-Saharan African countries, where
the 2006 average was 48.1 days).24
The conclusions from the aforementioned
OECD and World Bank papers that trade facil-
itation reforms might be more rewarding than
tariff cuts corroborates conclusions from an ear-
lier journal article, which found that “transport
cost incidence” (measured as shipping cost as a
percentage of the trade value) exceeded “tariff
incidence” (measured as the trade-weighted ad
valorem duty actually paid) for 168 out of 216
U.S. trading partners.25 Trade-related transac-
tion costs, including freight charges and other
logistics expenses, are a crucial determinant of a
country’s ability to participate in the global
economy. Access to foreign markets, which is an
important determinant of per capita GDP, is
very much a function of transportation costs.
Thus, transportation cost is a determinant of
GDP per capita. According to World Bank esti-
mates, when shipping costs double, annual
growth rates are curbed by one-half percentage
point on average.26
In a multitude of studies, transit time has
been found to be an important determinant of
cost, which in turn is an important determi-
nant of trade. Other studies, including those
based on the recently completed Logistics
Performance Index,27 find that measures taken
to hedge against the risks of uncertainty are
even more significant than the costs associated
with transit time in determining trade: “While
costs and timeliness are of paramount impor-
tance, traders are primarily concerned with the
overall reliability of the supply chain. Costs
related to hedging against uncertainty have
become a significant part of logistics costs in
many countries.”28
Interpretation of the LPI data reveals that a
firm’s competitiveness is influenced most by the
predictability and the performance of its supply
chain. Firms directly incur the costs of transport
(including freight, port, handling, procedural
fees, agent fees, and side payments), but they
also realize the induced costs associated with
hedging against the lack of predictability and
reliability. Those induced costs may include the
commitment of working capital to maintaining
higher inventories of inputs and finished prod-
ucts or greater frequency of use of more expen-
sive modes of transportation to meet production
schedules. Typically, induced costs are higher
when the supply chain is less predictable and less
reliable. As reported in Connecting to Compete:
Trade Logistics in the Global Economy, “suppliers
to the same automobile manufacturer will carry
7 days of inventory in Italy but 35 days in
Morocco. Some retailers in African countries
maintain three months of inventories or more.
Bangladesh has to ship, on average, 10 percent
of its garment production by air to be certain to
meet the schedules of European buyers.”29
Economists and researchers agree that mea-
sures that reduce transportation costs and tran-
sit times and increase predictability and confi-
dence in the operation of the supply chain can
increase the volume and value of trade. The
cost of unpredictability is a major constraint for
companies trying to diversify into higher-value
production. The challenge is to maintain effi-
cient supply chains, not just for exports, but for
imported materials and components as well.
But cost, time, and predictability are merely
symptoms; they reflect other factors, such as
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the quality and quantity of physical infrastruc-
ture, the level of adaptation of high technology
in logistics, the business and regulatory envi-
ronment, governance, geography, the size of
the public sector, and the quality and stability
of the political system.
Understanding the contribution of those fac-
tors is essential to determining which reforms
might work best. Those factors differ in rele-
vance from country to country, as problems dif-
fer in intensity. That suggests that appropriate
reforms and the optimal sequence of reforms are
likely to differ from country to country. There is
no one-size-fits-all approach to implementing
the reforms that will give the biggest bang for
the buck.
What Needs Reforming?
The body of research concerning the most
effective kinds of measures to reduce costs and
transit times and to increase supply chain pre-
dictability is small but growing. Yet a lot of the
research is generating intuitive conclusions.
Common problems that add to transportation-
related costs and are proper subjects of reform
include the frequent reloading of goods, port
congestion, complicated customs-clearance pro-
cedures, complex and nontransparent adminis-
trative requirements, limited use of automation,
and uncertainty about the enforceability of legal
documents such as bills of lading and letters of
credit.30
A comprehensive 2003 World Bank paper
homed in on four broad areas for trade facilita-
tion reform—port efficiency, customs environ-
ment, regulatory environment, and electronic
business usage—to determine which reforms
would be most effective within the APEC
region. The researchers designed the “port effi-
ciency” criterion to measure the quality of the
infrastructure at sea and air ports; they designed
“customs environment” to measure the direct
customs costs and the administrative transparen-
cy of customs and border crossings, “regulatory
environment” to measure the economy’s “ap-
proach to regulations,” and “E-business usage” to
measure the extent to which an economy has the
necessary domestic infrastructure—telecommu-
nications, financial intermediaries, logistics firms
—and is using networked information to im-
prove efficiency and enhance economic activity.31
Using mostly survey data and a gravity
model, the authors found a large and positive
correlation between port efficiency and trade, a
large and negative correlation between the extent
of regulations and trade, and positive (but not as
strong) relationships between the customs envi-
ronment and trade and between e-business usage
and trade. The authors then estimated that if
each of the APEC members that scored below
average in the three positively correlated trade
facilitation measure groups improved their scores
“halfway to the average,” intra-APEC trade
would increase by an estimated $254 billion per
year—an increase of about 21 percent. About
half of the gain would come from improved port
efficiency.32
In 2004 the same authors changed method-
ology slightly and broadened the scope to
include all manufacturing trade of 75 countries
in 2000–2001. The total gain in annual manu-
facturing trade flow, if below-average countries
improved their four scores halfway to the aver-
age, was found to be $377 billion.33 The authors
summarized their finding thusly: “Most regions
gain more in terms of exports than imports in
large part through increasing exports to the
OECD market. The most important ingredient in
getting these gains, particularly to the OECD mar-
ket, is the country’s own trade facilitation efforts.”34
The authors also attributed 28 percent of
the $377 billion increase in trade to improve-
ments in port efficiency, 9 percent to improve-
ments in the customs environment, 22 percent
to improvements in the regulatory environ-
ment, and 41 percent to improvements in ser-
vice sector infrastructure (approximated by the
use of E-trade).35
A 2007 paper produced jointly by APEC and
the World Bank Research Group found that
improving trade transparency among APEC
countries would have a substantial impact on
trade flows relative to other reform options. The
authors identified two “touchstones” of trans-
parency—predictability and simplicity—and
then identified and benchmarked policies that
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would be likely to affect those two measures
favorably.They estimated predictability using fac-
tors such as: the percentage of tariff lines that are
bound; the “flatness” of the applied tariff schedule
(the “flatter” the schedule, the closer each tariff
rate is to the average and therefore the less room
there is for unpredictability of duty assessments
attributable to differences in merchandise classifi-
cations, which is often a matter of customs dis-
cretion), the absence of hidden trade barriers, and
others.The simplicity benchmark included some
of the same policies (for different reasons), but
also factors such as more streamlined documen-
tary requirements, fewer border agencies, and
limited unofficial payments (i.e., bribes).36 The
authors then constructed indices from these fac-
tors and found that improvement in transparency
that raises all below-average countries to the aver-
age is associated with a 7.5 percent, or $148 bil-
lion, increase in intra-APEC trade.37
The quality of governance and the related
issue of corruption are also important determi-
nants of transaction costs, time, and the level of
predictability. In many countries, unofficial pay-
ments or “facilitation payments” to customs and
other border officials remain commonplace.
Where such payments are common practice and
in countries where customs revenues account for
a large share of the government’s budget, hostil-
ity to trade facilitation reforms constitutes a
major hurdle.
As Figure 1 shows, there appears to be a fair-
ly strong relationship between levels of corruption
(as measured in Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index) and logistics per-
formance (as measured in the LPI). Countries
where the perception of corruption is lower are
more likely to perform better on logistics percep-
tions; and countries where corruption is more
pronounced appear to have greater frictions in
their logistics environments.
As articulated in one study, “Poor logistics
environments are often characterized by rent-
seeking, which creates powerful vested interests
working to maintain the status quo.”38 Put dif-
ferently in another study, “The main cost com-
ponent associated with implementing some of
the TF [trade facilitation] measures may often
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bank.org/etools/tradesurvey/mode1b.asp, and Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, http://www.
transparency.org/.
Note: Each point is a country’s set of scores for both indices.
Logistics Score (% of best possible score)
not be related to regulatory, training, or equip-
ment costs, but to political costs.”39 And polit-
ical costs are likely to be higher in low-income
countries. As noted in a third study, “High tar-
iff barriers in low-income countries are reflect-
ed in the large share of import duties in their
fiscal revenues: the low-income average is 26
percent while the high-income OECD aver-
age is only 1.3 percent.”40 When tariffs account
for a large share of government revenue, there
may be a systemic aversion to trade facilitation
reforms.
The authors of Connecting to Compete found
that the most important factors influencing
logistics performance were the quality of infra-
structure, the competence of logistics services
providers, procedures of customs and other
border agencies, the level of corruption and
transparency, and the reliability of the trading
system and supply chains.41
The quality of a country’s logistics infra-
structure—specifically its telecommunications
and information technology infrastructure—is
an essential consideration when it comes to a
company’s decision about whether to locate
there, whether to engage the countries suppli-
ers, or whether to enter the market. For coun-
tries that perform average or below average on
the LPI, the quality of transport infrastructure
was identified as a concern among the logistics
operators surveyed.42
The Connecting to Compete authors also found
that the competence of service providers, such as
customs brokers, transportation companies, and
warehouse operators,was a crucial determinant of
overall logistics performance. Privatization of
those services was found to be an important step
in the right direction: “Logistics performance is
more and more determined by the availability of
quality, competitive private services—such as
trucking, customs brokering, and warehousing.”43
The 2004 Global Economic Prospects report
warned of the rising costs and anticompetitive
effect of international transport regulations.
“Private entry and competitive market structures
have proved viable for almost all transport modes
and generally have brought greater efficiency and
lower prices for consumers. However, public and
private barriers remain pervasive in air and mar-
itime transport—restricting competition and
increasing costs. In general, they should be replaced
with systems that rely on private provision of ser-
vices.”44
Those conclusions apply every bit as much
to developed countries as they do to developing
ones. Trade facilitation is not only for develop-
ing countries. Most rich countries have a lot to
gain from trade facilitation, as well.
Low-Hanging Fruit Ripe for
Reforms in the United States
The United States ranked 15th in the most
recent Doing Business, “ Trading Across Borders”
survey. As Table 1 shows, with respect to each of
the measurements on the “Trading Across
Borders” survey, the U.S. situation was better
than the world average. For example, the United
States requires four documents for export,
whereas the world average is seven. It takes 6
days to export from the United States, but 26.1
days from all countries, on average. The cost to
export a container from the United States is
$960, whereas the global average is $1,230.
Similar differences are evident on the import
side as well.
Those scores are pretty good relative to all
of the other countries measured, but the pro-
ducers and workers in the 13 and 14 countries
ranked higher on the respective surveys com-
pete with American-based producers and
workers for markets and investment.
Singapore earned the number one ranking in
“Trading Across Borders.” As can be deter-
mined from the data in Table 1, exporting from
Singapore requires 16 percent less time at 43
percent of the cost of exporting from the United
States. On the import side, the relative efficien-
cies in Singapore are even more pronounced (40
percent less time at 32 percent of the cost). Even
though U.S. trade logistics performance is above
average, that result does not justify complacency.
Singapore’s performance demonstrates that
there is ample room for U.S. improvement.
Among the 150 countries measured by the
Logistics Performance Index, the United States
ranked 14th, with a score of 3.84 out of a possi-
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ble 5. The LPI is the simple average of each
country’s scores (on a scale of 1 to 5) on seven key
measures of trade facilitation: (1) efficiency and
effectiveness of the clearance process by customs
and other border control agencies, (2) the quali-
ty of transport and IT infrastructure for logistics,
(3) the ease and affordability of arranging ship-
ments, (4) the competence of local logistics ser-
vice providers, (5) the ability to track and trace
international shipments, (6) domestic logistics
costs, and (7) the timeliness of shipments in
reaching the destination.45
Singapore earned the highest ranking on this
survey as well, scoring 4.19 out of 5 overall or
about 9 percent higher than the United States.
A closer look at the U.S. scores for the various
components of the LPI reveals areas for im-
provement, and one particular trouble spot. Out
of 150 countries, the United States ranked 7th
on “Infrastructure,” 10th on “Tracking and
Tracing,” 13th on “Logistics Competence,” 19th
on “Customs,” 19th on “Timeliness,” 20th on
“International Shipments,” and a dismal 144th
on “Domestic Logistics Costs.” Higher logistics
costs tend to be associated with limitations on
competition, as discussed earlier with respect to
U.S. freight-rail service.46
In addition to the lack of U.S. freight-rail
competition, other U.S. laws and regulations
work to drive up the costs of domestic logistics.
The most enduring scheme to this effect is sec-
tion 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920
(also known as the Jones Act), which “protects
U.S.-flag vessels and shipbuilders from import
competition in the U.S. domestic oceanborne
trade.”47 Under the Jones Act, the transport of
cargo between U.S. ports must be performed
on vessels that are built and registered in the
United States, and are owned and crewed by
U.S. citizens.
Beyond the Jones Act, several other U.S. laws
exist that restrict cabotage (the transport of mer-
chandise between domestic ports) participation
to U.S. vessels. For example, pursuant to the
Cargo Preference Act of 1954, U.S.-flagged ves-
sels are required to transport at least 50 percent
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Table 1
Various Trade Facilitation Metrics by Region or Country
Cost to Cost to
Documents Time export Documents Time import
for export for export (US$ per for import for import (US$ per
Region or Economy (number) (days) container) (number) (days) container)
East Asia & Pacific 6.9 24.5 $885 7.5 25.8 $1,015
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia 7.0 29.3 $1,393 8.3 30.8 $1,551
Latin America & 
Caribbean 6.7 22.6 $1,096 7.7 24.0 $1,208
Middle East & 
North Africa 7.1 24.8 $992 8.0 28.7 $1,129
OECD 4.5 9.8 $905 5.0 10.4 $986
South Asia 8.6 32.5 $1,180 9.1 32.1 $1,418
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.1 35.6 $1,660 9.0 43.7 $1,986
All Countries 7.0 26.1 $1,230 7.8 29.7 $1,412
United States 4.0 6.0 $960 5.0 5.0 $1,160
Singapore (Best) 4.0 5.0 $416 4.0 3.0 $367
Kazakhstan (Worst) 12.0 89.0 $2,730 14.0 76.0 $2,780
Source: Doing Business 2008, “Trading Across Borders,” http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/TradingAcross
Borders/.
of government-owned cargo and all U.S. mili-
tary cargo.48 Under the Food Security Act of
1985, U.S.-flagged vessels must transport at
least 75 percent of agricultural cargo that is part
of foreign assistance programs administered by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the
U.S. Agency for International Development.49
Moreover, U.S. law requires that freight in con-
nection with Export-Import Bank loans be
shipped by U.S.-flagged vessels (unless the U.S.
Maritime Administration grants a waiver per-
mitting the recipient country to use its own
flagged vessels).50
Cabotage restrictions artificially raise the
costs of domestic transport by limiting the sup-
ply and suppressing the quality of service. A
comparison of the daily operating expenses for
U.S.-flagged and foreign-flagged vessels pro-
vides a rough approximation of a portion of the
direct economic costs of U.S. shipping restric-
tions. Operating expenses include wages paid
to crews, direct fuel charges, insurance, mainte-
nance and repair, and other administrative
expenses.
According to data published by the U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission, the total daily operat-
ing expenses for a U.S.-flagged tanker ship in 2005
were $27,900 versus $16,600 for a foreign-flagged
tanker, and $34,260 for a U.S.-flagged container
ship versus $22,190 for a foreign-flagged contain-
er ship.51 Of course, the lack of competition allows
domestic carriers to increase rates,which represents
a cost to traders not captured by the difference in
operating costs above.
Restrictions on cross-border trucking also
contribute to higher U.S. logistics costs. Under
the North American Free Trade Agreement,
Mexican truckers were to be granted full access
to the U.S. market for cross-border shipments.
Fourteen years later, only a select few Mexican
trucking companies pursuant to a temporary
pilot program can serve U.S. locations beyond
a narrow commercial zone (extending about 20
miles north of U.S. border towns). As a conse-
quence, the operation of U.S. trucks in Mexico
is severely restricted as well.
Road safety and environmental concerns have
been the fig leaves behind which the Teamsters
and other anti-NAFTA groups have tried to
conceal their true motives. According to a recent
survey by the Arizona Republic, since 2003 only
1.2 percent of Mexican truck drivers operating
on U.S. roads have been found to be out of com-
pliance with safety or environmental regulations,
compared with 7 percent of American truck dri-
vers. And since 80 percent of U.S. trade with
Mexico travels by truck, the logistical steps
required to comply with the trucking ban—such
as stopping and transferring containers from for-
eign to domestic trucks—are enormously costly,
adding delays and $200 million to $400 million
in transportation costs.52
The truck ban is not the only factor con-
tributing to increased delays and costs of cross-
border transport. Another factor is simply the
dramatic increase in cross-border trade since the
North American Free Trade Agreement took
effect. Increasing volumes of trade, tightened
U.S. border security, and inadequate investment
in U.S. border-crossing infrastructure have com-
bined to significantly increase waiting times and
costs. In recognition of this growing problem,
Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) and Rep.
Ciro Rodriguez (D-TX) introduced companion
bills in their respective chambers that would
require the Departments of Transportation and
Commerce to study border wait times and to
measure their adverse economic impact.53
CBP (like the U.S. Customs Service before
it) has always had to walk a fine line, balancing
its enforcement mandate with the imperative
to facilitate—or at least not impede—trade.
The post-9/11 U.S. focus on security may be
tipping the balance toward the enforcement
mandate and away from the business facilita-
tion imperative. Although initiatives like the
Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism
(C-TPAT),54 the Container Security Initiative
(CSI),55 and the Security and Accountability
for Every Port (SAFE) Act56 are intended to
improve security without unnecessarily inter-
fering with the flow of commerce, those objec-
tives are not always met. Key security concerns
remain unremedied, and for many entities the
costs of these programs outweigh the benefits.
A report by the Conference Board of
Canada, a public policy research organization,
found that for firms engaged in cross-border
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trade, tighter security requirements increased the
direct compliance costs and indirect costs related
to longer border delays.57 Still, a 2005 report
from the U.S. Government Accountability
Office reviewed the CSI and C-TPAT programs
and found shortcomings in their effectiveness:
uniform standards for assessing supply chain
security are not in place; screening equipment at
some ports may be incapable of detecting
weapons of mass destruction, and ship cargo
manifest data may be inaccurate, and therefore
ineffective in identifying dangerous goods.58
Accordingly, a recent University of Virginia sur-
vey of companies participating in the C-TPAT
program found that only about one-third of
respondents reported that the benefits of the
program outweighed its costs.59
Although security is an obviously vital objec-
tive, 100 percent guaranteed security of interna-
tional supply chains would require nothing short
of a complete shutdown of international com-
merce. And still there would be no guarantees.
That’s not a viable option. Risk management—
and not risk elimination—is the practicable
approach to balancing security with economic
vitality.Thus, it is important that laws passed and
regulations implemented continue to allow for
“risk-based” approaches to securing the supply
chain, which employ statistically valid sampling
methods to identify higher-risk cargo for further
examination. The requirement that a plan be in
place by 2012 to scan every U.S.-bound contain-
er for radioactivity defies the principles of risk
management and will likely result in higher costs
and longer delays for imports—and for exports
as trade partners implement similar measures—
without necessarily keeping us safer than we
would be if a less intrusive, less expensive, statis-
tically valid approach to managing risk were
implemented instead.
For that matter, all agencies with jurisdic-
tion over issues that affect the quality and effi-
ciency of the supply chain should adopt risk-
based approaches to safety. The public outcry
and congressional response to last year’s spate
of consumer product and food safety issues
might very well yield overly intrusive inspec-
tion regimes that add layers of unnecessary
costs to the supply chain.
Legitimate concerns about terrorism and
safety are often conflated with unfounded fears
about imports and Mexican trucks and foreign
investment. Fear is a great motivator, but it often
provokes overreaction, as was the case with the
political response to Dubai Port World’s pur-
chase of U.S. port facilities in 2006.60 If the
United States wants to improve its trade logis-
tics and ascend the Doing Business and LPI
rankings, one logical reform is to be open to for-
eign investment in its ports. If any company
knows how to bring best practices and efficient
operations to port facilities, as one of the world’s
largest port operators, Dubai Port World prob-
ably does.
Are New Rules and
Agreements Really Necessary?
The topic of trade facilitation resides at the
intersection of trade policy, development eco-
nomics, and the world of customs, logistics, and
supply chain management. Accordingly, many
different organizations—from the World Bank
and the United Nations Committee on Trade
and Development to the World Customs Organ-
ization and the International Freight Forwarders
Association to the OECD, APEC, and the
World Trade Organization—have something to
say about trade facilitation. Each is interested in
the subject for different reasons, each has its own
operational definitions, and each has ideas about
the best way to foster meaningful trade facilita-
tion.
Rules concerning aspects of trade facilitation,
including provisions aimed at enhancing trans-
parency and setting minimum procedural stan-
dards, have been a part of the multilateral trad-
ing system for many years. Articles V, VIII, and
X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade concern issues of freedom of transit, fees
and formalities connected with importation and
exportation, and publication and administration
of trade regulations. At the Singapore
Ministerial Conference in 1996, trade ministers
agreed to add trade facilitation to the WTO
agenda as a separate topic and directed the
Goods Council to “undertake exploratory and
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analytical work . . . on the simplification of trade
procedures in order to assess the scope for
WTO rules in this area.”61
Negotiations on trade facilitation became a
formal part of the Doha Round agenda in 2004,
when the Goods Council decided by consensus
to begin negotiations on the basis of the
Modalities for Negotiations on Trade Facilitation
(Annex D of the so-called “July Package”). The
first and third sentence of the first paragraph
(below) of a 10-paragraph annex set the parame-
ters for the substance of the negotiations:
Negotiations shall aim to clarify and
improve relevant aspects of Articles V,
VIII and X of the GATT 1994 with a
view to further expediting the move-
ment, release and clearance of goods,
including goods in transit. Negotiations
shall also aim at enhancing technical
assistance and support for capacity
building in this area. The negotiations
shall further aim at provisions for effec-
tive cooperation between customs or
any other appropriate authorities on
trade facilitation and customs compli-
ance issues.62
The second sentence of the first paragraph
(above) and seven other full paragraphs concern
issues of capacity building and “special and dif-
ferential” treatment for developing countries.
There is no doubt that some trade facilitation
reforms are costly undertakings, but many—
including those envisaged by the language of
Annex D—are quite modest. In keeping with
the WTO’s trade (and not development) focus,
the language is aimed at improving activities at
the border and does not accommodate grandiose
plans for major infrastructure projects.
A review of the first 50 proposals submitted to
the WTO Negotiating Group on Trade Facili-
tation found that “most trade facilitation mea-
sures would entail some start-up costs for govern-
ment agencies in the short term. However, once
the measures are established, it is unlikely that
significant financial burdens would be involved to
maintain these measures. In fact, most proposals
recognize that the introduction and implementa-
tion of TF would eventually reduce government
expenditures through enhanced transaction effi-
ciency and transparency, elimination of duplica-
tive or bureaucratic functions, more economical
allocation and more reasonable and efficient use
of administrative resources.”63
A report based on a 2006 APEC survey of
the literature assessing the costs and benefits of
trade facilitation measures under negotiation in
the Doha Round found that “no, or very few,
countries would lose from global trade facilita-
tion and that developing countries have the most
to gain from implementation of TFMs, although
important variations can be expected across coun-
tries, sectors, and types of traders.”64 The fact that
variations can be expected suggests that one-
size-fits-all agreement to undertake particular
reforms with the promise of funding from devel-
oped countries will encourage countries to adopt
measures that will prove unnecessary or unsuc-
cessful. Furthermore, according to the report:
“Long-term savings greatly exceed the perceived
implementation costs for all measures consid-
ered. However TFMs under consideration by
the NGTF [Negotiating Group on Trade Facili-
tation] for possible inclusion in revised GATT
articles V, VIII, and X should be selected carefully
as overall cost implications for Governments dif-
fer significantly across measures, as does time
needed for implementation in LDCs [least
developed countries].”65 Likewise, the need to
select reforms carefully because of cost implica-
tions suggests the need for customization, and
not commoditization, of reforms. It makes more
sense for countries to adopt reforms suited to
their particular situations than to impose top-
down, mandated, homogenous reforms.
By having negotiations on trade facilitation
on the Doha agenda, countries are less likely to
treat reform as something that is primarily in
their own interests. Instead, it will be subject to
the same “mercantilization” that has halted
progress in the other Doha negotiations. The
tie-in of “capacity building” or “aid-for-trade”
in the Doha negotiations, which requires rich
countries to effectively pay developing coun-
tries to implement their reforms, reinforces the
perception that the process is a quid-pro-quo
and therefore endangers prospects for reform.
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As longtime World Bank economist J. Michael
Finger puts it: “To superimpose a process that
presents the issue as a mercantilist bargain of
assistance in exchange for trade reform ‘conces-
sions’ would be to introduce conflict into a rela-
tionship that is already productively propelled
by a perception of mutual benefit.”66
Instead of going forward with trade facilita-
tion reforms that will benefit their economies,
developing countries have an incentive to post-
pone reforms and wait for the financial assistance
that the negotiations promise. And developing
countries have incentive to inflate the estimated
cost of their trade facilitation proposals. Accord-
ing to Finger, “self-assessment—as a process of
bringing forward requests for assistance—may
increase the size of each country’s request and
increase the attractiveness of such requests as an
alternative to using their own resources.”67
Furthermore, when others are paying for reforms
—particularly institutions that have a poor track
record of accounting for the costs and benefits of
their assistance—there is less incentive to imple-
ment the best procedures or to prioritize projects
optimally. Since negotiations on trade facilitation
were added to the Doha agenda, many reform
proposals have been submitted to the Negoti-
ating Group on Trade Facilitation by WTO
members, but very few have been supplemented
by the reality check of implementation audits.
Moral hazard aside, the need for binding
multilateral rules to compel reform is not evi-
dent. As the World Bank’s annual Global
Economic Prospects report put it in 2004:
Implementing institutional changes
requires country ownership and volun-
tary actions . . . It is not clear that any
new rules could be enforced through
conventional dispute-settlement pro-
ceedings and penalties, since violations
of those rules often stem from the lim-
ited capacity of governments to meet
their obligations. Rules alone are not
likely to produce the desired reforms
or modernizations. Those depend on
capacity building, and capacity build-
ing depends on resources—financial
and other.68
Negotiations on trade facilitation—and the
related aid-for-trade tie-in—are impracticable,
distortive, and counterproductive. It should be
self-evident to all countries at all stages of
development that facilitating the movement,
clearance, and distribution of traded goods is
incontrovertibly good for their economies, and
that any “agreement”—beyond providing the
benefit of greater certainty of commitment to
reform—would be superfluous.
In Spite of Doha
Over the last decade, nearly every country
reduced its tariff barriers, and only 3 out of 136
countries experienced an increase in overall
“trade restrictiveness.”69 During the period, all
regions of the world experienced real growth in
trade, and since the year 2000 developing
countries’ trade growth rates have exceeded
those of high-income countries.70
In light of the findings that trade facilitation
reforms are probably more consequential than
further tariff liberalization for many countries
and that there is vast room for improvement in
trade facilitation (as evidenced by the perfor-
mance spread found in the “Trading Across
Borders” and LPI surveys, for example), all
countries should be moving forward—at least
with relatively inexpensive reforms—without
waiting for some multilateral agreement. Many
countries are already doing so.
Without a Doha agreement, countries are
already modernizing their customs procedures,
investing in trade infrastructure, and adopting
international best practices. According to
Finger:
Many developing countries have in place
active programmes to improve trade
facilitation—often financed from their
own resources, and with contributions
from their own businesses. [A recent
OECD study] reports that a number of
developing countries, including least
developed countries, have “become
champions of reform by introducing far-
reaching reforms” such as single window
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[one location for submitting administra-
tive paperwork and addressing all com-
pliance issues], risk management and
post-clearance audit. Senegal, Ghana,
Mauritius and Mozambique are exam-
ples of countries that have today highly
performing Customs and other border
controls. Because improved facilities
mean better business for local companies,
reforms in developing countries are often
driven and financed by local private/pub-
lic partnerships.71
APEC members, which comprise both rich
and developing countries, successfully met the
1994 goal of reducing trade transaction costs by 5
percent by 2006—and have decided to shoot for
another 5 percent reduction by 2010—without
any formal agreement. Trade is advancing with-
out any near-term prospects for Doha. Trade
facilitation measures are being implemented.
Figure 2 provides a broad-stroke perspec-
tive on the breadth and depth of trade facilita-
tion reforms implemented or progress recog-
nized between 2005 and 2007. Although more
countries reported increases in the costs of both
container imports and exports, the number of
countries reporting reductions in the number
of documents and wait times over the two-year
period far exceeds the handful of reporting
increases. The fact that the costs of containers
rose for most countries is probably attributable
to factors beyond those countries’ control. An
absolute increase in cost does not necessarily
constitute a relative disadvantage if other coun-
tries’ costs rose too. But the improvements in
factors most immediately within the control of
each country—waiting time and red tape—
reflect widespread reform efforts, according to
the “Trading Across Borders” data.
The LPI also suggests that trade facilitation
reforms have been widespread and successful.
Large percentages of respondents acknowledged
“positive trends in developments” across coun-
tries on a wide variety of metrics. As Table 2
indicates, a majority of respondents reported
that the availability of private sector services had
improved in every region of the world, and a
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Changes in Trade Facilitation Metrics, 2005 to 2007: Number of Countries Reporting
Decreases and Increases by Metric
Source: Doing Business database at www.worldbank.org.
majority of respondents reported improvements
in all six metrics for non-OECD Europe and
Central Asia.
In this highly competitive, increasingly inter-
connected global economy, companies are com-
peting not only for markets but for investment
and the opportunity to be part of the supply
chain. Companies are less inclined to do busi-
ness in jurisdictions where governments main-
tain policies that add roadblocks or unnecessary
frictions to the flow of trade. And that deprives
those countries of investment, jobs, and afford-
able consumer choices.
There is no compelling reason to believe
that the trend of more trade and growth will
reverse or even slow in the absence of a suc-
cessful Doha Round agreement. Demand is
likely to continue to grow in recently emergent
economies and as the world’s producers contin-
ue the transition to decentralized, transnation-
al production processes to meet that growing
demand. A recent World Bank study forecasts
a threefold increase in global goods and ser-
vices trade to $27 trillion by 2030.72 To capital-
ize on that growth and to be a part of the hub-
and-spoke global supply chain, countries will
have to be nimble with respect to trade regula-
tions and infrastructure.
Not only is trade facilitation in the interests
of all countries, it is an economic imperative for
countries competing with China. In more ways
than one, the emergence of China has played an
important role in trade facilitation reforms in
developing countries. There’s nothing like the
existential threat of relentless competition to
focus minds.
When the longstanding quota regime govern-
ing trade in textiles and apparel was finally termi-
nated at the end of 2004,there was widespread con-
cern among analysts that Chinese exports would
expand and take away market share for the many
developing countries that rely heavily on these
industries. Chinese exports did surge, but many
other countries that were presumed highly vulnera-
ble adapted to new realities and have survived.
According to the World Bank Global Monitor-
ing Report 2007: “The countries best able to
expand clothing exports will be those that have a
supportive business environment, low trade costs
(efficient customs, ports, and other transport
infrastructure), and competitive firms flexible
enough to meet the changing demands of the
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Table 2
Percent of Respondents Acknowledging Positive Trends in Developments for the
Following Areas, During the Last Three Years
High income Europe & Latin Middle Sub-
OECD & East Asia Central America & East & South Saharan
non-OECD & Pacific Asia Caribbean North Africa Asia Africa
Overall Business 
Environment 57 44 66 61 68 64 38
Availability of private 
sector services 58 54 82 70 81 78 51
Quality of telecommuni-
cations infrastructure 85 47 89 65 98 71 62
Quality of transport 
infrastructure 56 41 57 38 67 40 33
Other border crossing-
related government 
agencies clearance pro-
cedures 43 26 62 28 38 30 42
Customs clearance 
procedures 65 38 69 58 70 60 48
Source: Logistics Performance Index.
global buyers that now dominate the industry.
With these conditions in place, the clothing sec-
tor can still be a driver of industrial diversification
in many poor countries, even in the face of unfet-
tered competition from China.”73 In a recent
journal article, Steve Creskoff explains the bene-
fits of trade facilitation to poor countries compet-
ing with China this way:
Cambodia’s principal exports are gar-
ments, which are generally subject to
high tariffs imposed by the United
States and other developed countries.
Cambodia’s main competitor regarding
garment exports is China, which has a
substantial advantage over Cambodia
in trade facilitation. Reduction of tariffs
on garment imports on a multilateral
basis does nothing to help Cambodia
vis-à-vis China, whereas improvement
in trade facilitation in Cambodia to
China’s level would make Cambodian
exports much more competitive with
China.74
Given the diversity of issues, resources, capa-
bilities, and preferences around the world, set-
ting benchmarks for trade facilitation improve-
ments without mandating specific reforms, as
APEC has done with success, seems a useful
and practicable alternative to cumbersome mul-
tilateral commitments backed up by the force of
dispute settlement. As the World Bank’s Global
Economic Prospects 2007 report put it: “Broad
trade facilitation goals do not fit neatly into the
disciplines of the World Trade Organization.”
Instead, striving for continuous improvement
by following intuitive principles might be a better
alternative. Such principles are explicit in the
World Customs Organization’s International
Convention on the Simplification and Harmoni-
zation of Customs Procedures (as amended), better
known as the Revised Kyoto Convention, which
took effect in 2006. The Revised Kyoto Con-
vention reflects the commitment of its contract-
ing parties to eliminate customs procedures that
can impede international trade and to simplify
and harmonize customs procedures without
compromising legitimate customs’ objectives.
The principles encourage modernization, pre-
dictability, consistency, and transparency of cus-
toms procedures and practices.75
The Revised Kyoto Convention is consid-
ered a modern trade facilitation “best practices”
and serves as a blueprint for reform in develop-
ing countries. It should also serve as a beacon for
ongoing trade facilitation reform. Out of 56 sig-
natories to the Revised Kyoto Convention, there
are already 24 that are developing or transition-
al economies, and 13 of them are African.76
Conclusion
With world trade continuing to grow faster
than global output, it is imperative that gov-
ernments embrace practices that position their
citizens to compete effectively for markets and
investment. Successful participation in the
global economy will be increasingly deter-
mined by whether a country maintains high-
quality, reliable trade infrastructure, whether
competition is permitted to flourish in the
logistics services industries, and whether the
regulatory environment is conducive to the rel-
atively frictionless movement of goods and ser-
vices through the supply chain.
Trade facilitation is not only for developing
countries. All countries can benefit from the
reform and continuous improvements of their
trade processes. The kinds of reforms that move
countries in the necessary direction do not
require formal commitments and obligations to
other countries. Trade facilitation is primarily
and substantially in the interest of the country
implementing reform. And there is ample evi-
dence that those reforms are being implement-
ed around the world without any immediate
prospects for a Doha Round agreement anyway.
In the United States, official policies stem-
ming from the post-9/11 focus on securing
international trade processes do not necessarily
dovetail with the objectives of just-in-time sup-
ply chain systems. Although security is para-
mount, it is crucial to understand that there are
costs to security-driven policies, which can ham-
per trade and curtail economic growth without
necessarily improving security. U.S. procedures
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for expediting the clearance of goods through
customs and other administrative agencies must
keep up with the demands imposed by higher
trade volumes and the imperative to secure sup-
ply chains.
Notwithstanding the elevated focus on secu-
rity, though, goods flow in and out of the United
States relatively smoothly. On both the Doing
Business survey and the Logistics Performance
Index, the United States fares in the top 10 per-
cent of all countries. But there is ample room for
improvement in the supply chain, particularly
where domestic logistics services are concerned.
Regulations under the Jones Act, which for-
bid foreign-flagged ships from operating within
the United States (between U.S. ports), consti-
tute a serious departure from optimal trade facil-
itation. By limiting competition in the sector,
the cost of transportation services within the
United States is higher and the quality is lower
than it should be. Prohibitions against foreign
cabotage lead to higher demand for and greater
costs of surface transportation services to get
products through the supply chain. Demand for
more trucking services also creates more conges-
tion, which reduces the quality and further
increases the cost of those services, as measured
by transport times. Likewise, the limited com-
petition in rail freight service also serves to add
frictions to the U.S. supply chain, which can
deter investment and hamper revenues of busi-
nesses that operate in the United States.
Trade facilitation is about overcoming natur-
al and manmade obstacles to trade. Particularly
in light of the absence of any real progress in the
Doha Round, policymakers should focus their
efforts on removing frictions  from their supply
chains.
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